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On Organizations and Oligarchies: Michels in the Twenty-First Century
Abstract
[Excerpt] A central problem for those interested in studying and explaining the actions of organizations is
how to conceptualize these social phenomena. In particular, because organizations are constituted by
individuals, each of whom may seek to achieve his or her interests through the organization, questions of how
decisions are made in organizations and whose preferences drive those decisions are critical to explaining
organizational actions. Although early organizational scholars spent much time wrestling with these questions
(e.g. Barnard 1938; Simon 1947; Parsons 1956; March and Simon 1958), more recent work in organizational
studies has tended to elide them, adopting an implicit view of organizations as unitary actors, much like
individuals, and in particular, like individuals who operate with a coherent utility function that they seek to
maximize (e.g. Porter 1985; Baum et al. 2005; Casciaro and Piskorski 2005; Mezias and Boyle 2005; Jensen
2006). Thus, organizational behavior is seen as reflecting efforts to achieve a specific goal, which is,
presumably, that of enhancing the organizations interests.
While this may be the dominant conceptualization underlying much contemporary research, other work
sharply questions the validity and usefulness of this approach to organizational analysis (March and Simon
1958; Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972; Jackall 1988). Studies in this tradition suggest that it is more
appropriate in most instances to conceive of organizations as battlefields, constituted by shifting factions with
differing interests that vie for control of the organization; hence, organizational actions should be viewed as
reflecting the preferences of a victorious coalition at a given point in time. We suspect that, although most
people’s experience in organizations may make them sympathetic to the coalitional view and skeptical of the
unitary actor view, the continuing predilection for the latter stems at least in part from problems of deriving
systematic predictions of organizational behavior from a more chaotic, coalitional kaleidoscope perspective.
A different model of organizations is represented in the work of Robert Michels (1876-1936), who, nearly a
century ago, offered his now-famous, pithy summary of the fundamental nature of organizations ([1911]
1962: 365): ‘Who says organization, says oligarchy.’ Drawing on his own experiences with early twentieth-
century German political party organizations, Michels presented the drift to oligarchy as an ‘iron law’,
inevitably resulting in the division of even the most expressly democratic organizations into two parts: a small
stable set of elites and all the other members. His analysis offered a catalog of the processes and forces that
produced such a division, and he postulated that the directives of the elite, while nominally reflecting the set
of interests shared by all members, in actuality are driven by their own personal interests in the organization.
His provocative (and very pessimistic) arguments have served as the basis for many studies over the years,
particularly of organizations specifically formed to represent the interests of groups seeking to promote
change in political arenas. Much of this work has been focused on assessing the purported inevitability of the
emergence of oligarchies and defining the conditions of the iron law—i.e. those that affect the realization (or
suppression) of oligarchic tendencies.
In this chapter, we argue that Michels’s core arguments about the nature of oligarchies in organizations, and
research generated in response to his work, are not only relevant to understanding the dynamics of political
organizations but can be extended as a useful framework for thinking about important aspects of
contemporary economic corporations as well. In making this argument, we highlight the parallels between
Berle and Means’s analysis (1932) of modern, publicly held corporations and that of Michels. Both analyses
address the general organizational problem of ensuring representation of members’ interests. In political
organizations, it is the rank-and-file members’ interests that leaders are charged with representing; in publicly
held organizations, leaders are primarily responsible for representing the interests of stockholders, as the
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/1011
nominal owners’ of the firm. In this context, we consider evidence and research on problematic corporate
behavior to show how Michels’s work provides a useful framework for understanding these problems and for
formulating ways of addressing them.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N  
 A central problem for those interested in studying and explaining the actions of organizations is how to 
conceptualize these social phenomena. In particular, because organizations are constituted by individuals, each of whom 
may seek to achieve his or her interests through the organization, questions of how decisions are made in organizations 
and whose preferences drive those decisions are critical to explaining organizational actions. Although early organizational 
scholars spent much time wrestling with these questions (e.g. Barnard 1938; Simon 1947; Parsons 1956; March and Simon 
1958), more recent work in organizational studies has tended to elide them, adopting an implicit view of organizations as 
unitary actors, much like individuals, and in particular, like individuals who operate with a coherent utility function that 
they seek to maximize (e.g. Porter 1985; Baum et al. 2005; Casciaro and Piskorski 2005; Mezias and Boyle 2005; Jensen 
2006). Thus, organizational behavior is seen as reflecting efforts to achieve a specific goal, which is, presumably, that of 
enhancing the organizations interests. 
While this may be the dominant conceptualization underlying much contemporary research, other work sharply 
questions the validity and usefulness of this approach to organizational analysis (March and Simon 1958; Cohen, March, 
and Olsen 1972; Jackall 1988). Studies in this tradition suggest that it is more appropriate in most instances to conceive of 
organizations as battlefields, constituted by shifting factions with differing interests that vie for control of the organization; 
hence, organizational actions should be viewed as reflecting the preferences of a victorious coalition at a given point in 
time. We suspect that, although most people’s experience in organizations may make them sympathetic to the coalitional 
view and skeptical of the unitary actor view, the continuing predilection for the latter stems at least in part from problems 
of deriving systematic predictions of organizational behavior from a more chaotic, coalitional kaleidoscope perspective. 
A different model of organizations is represented in the work of Robert Michels (1876-1936), who, nearly a century 
ago, offered his now-famous, pithy summary of the fundamental nature of organizations ([1911] 1962: 365): ‘Who says 
organization, says oligarchy.’ Drawing on his own experiences with early twentieth-century German political party 
organizations, Michels presented the drift to oligarchy as an ‘iron law’, inevitably resulting in the division of even the most 
expressly democratic organizations into two parts: a small stable set of elites and all the other members. His analysis 
offered a catalog of the processes and forces that produced such a division, and he postulated that the directives of the 
elite, while nominally reflecting the set of interests shared by all members, in actuality are driven by their own personal 
interests in the organization. His provocative (and very pessimistic) arguments have served as the basis for many studies 
over the years, particularly of organizations specifically formed to represent the interests of groups seeking to promote 
change in political arenas. Much of this work has been focused on assessing the purported inevitability of the emergence 
of oligarchies and defining the conditions of the iron law—i.e. those that affect the realization (or suppression) of oligarchic 
tendencies. 
In this chapter, we argue that Michels’s core arguments about the nature of oligarchies in organizations, and research 
generated in response to his work, are not only relevant to understanding the dynamics of political organizations but can 
be extended as a useful framework for thinking about important aspects of contemporary economic corporations as well. 
In making this argument, we highlight the parallels between Berle and Means’s analysis (1932) of modern, publicly held 
corporations and that of Michels. Both analyses address the general organizational problem of ensuring representation of 
members’ interests. In political organizations, it is the rank-and-file members’ interests that leaders are charged with 
representing; in publicly held organizations, leaders are primarily responsible for representing the interests of 
stockholders, as the nominal owners’ of the firm. In this context, we consider evidence and research on problematic 
corporate behavior to show how Michels’s work provides a useful framework for understanding these problems and for 
formulating ways of addressing them. 
W H E R E  Do O L I G A R C H I E S  C O M E  F R O M ?  
 Michels’s interest in the problems of oligarchy stemmed directly from his own experiences in the left-wing German 
Social Democratic party, which he joined as a university student and served in various administrative roles for several 
years. Michels became progressively disenchanted with the party, and particularly with the leaders, whom he viewed as 
cynically building a highly undemocratic political machine while mobilizing members based on a platform of increasing 
social equality and democracy. This ultimately led him to dissolve his relationship with the party, but his prior affiliation 
took a toll on his career prospects as a faculty member in the conservative circles of early twentieth-century German 
academia. Despite the sponsorship of Max Weber, his friend and intellectual mentor, he was unable to obtain a position 
in Germany and was forced to take a position at the University of Turin in Italy (Gerth and Mills 1946: 19). Convinced of 
the impossibility of sustaining truly democratic organizations, he eventually became a supporter of Benito Mussolini, on 
the grounds that strong leaders were most effective (Collins and Makowsky 2005). 
His analysis of oligarchy in organizations clearly reflects his own experience in political and academic organizations. 
Ironically, he argued, it is the very success of organizations that sets in motion the evolutionary forces towards oligarchy. 
As organizations grow, the ability of members to participate directly in decision-making becomes progressively more 
constrained for a variety of reasons. At the most fundamental level, problems of finding times and places for all members 
to assemble for discussion of issues and decision making increase exponentially as the number of participants increases. 
In addition, his description of decision making in large groups foreshadows the sorts of social-psychological dynamics later 
elaborated by Janis’s (1971) discussion of groupthink: Tt is a fact of everyday experience that enormous public meetings 
commonly carry resolutions by acclamation or by general assent, whilst these same assemblies, if divided into small 
assemblies... would be much more guarded in their assent’ (Michels 1962: 64). 
Organizational growth eventually requires delegating responsibility for most decision making to a small subset of 
members. Michels notes that such delegation is often done with great reluctance and the freedom of the delegates to 
make decisions without general membership approval may be sharply curtailed. Such restrictions, however, typically 
negate the advantages of delegation. Coleman (1974: 38-9) describes this problem well in the following extended 
discussion: 
When men join together to create a corporate actor, whether it is an industrial corporation, a trade union, a 
neighbourhood association, or a political party, they find themselves confronted with a dilemma: to gain the benefits 
of organization, they must give over the use of certain rights, resources or power to the corporate body.... But each 
person, in turning over these rights, thereby loses a large measure of control over them. For the corporate actor may 
well act in a direction that he opposes— There is one apparent remedy for this: to create a constitution such that the 
corporate resources can be committed only when all corporators favour the action. This gives each person a veto power 
over corporate action. The defect of this solution, of course, is that the corporate actor is emasculated: it can do nothing 
in the absence of unanimity of the members. 
In consequence, efforts to assert effective membership control typically are abandoned, and the delegates are increasingly 
empowered to set-agendas with little input from members, to offer recommendations for action with only brief 
expositions of rationales, and to make decisions on behalf of all members. 
Moreover, organizational growth almost always induces increased complexity— the creation of separate, specialized 
positions and offices to carry out different tasks—and this leads to a need for in-depth, hard-to-gain knowledge of the 
organization in order to carry out administrative functions (Blau, Heydebrand, and Stauffer 1966; Hall, Johnson, and Haas 
1967; Pugh et al. 1968.) Increased complexity, in turn, gives rise to problems of coordination among task-interdependent 
subunits, which often lead to the development of formal rules and other more tacit integrative procedures (Lawrence and 
Lorsch 1967; Donaldson 1996; Sine, Mitsuhashi, and Kirsch 2006). Because mastery of these formal and informal rules, on 
which the day-to-day running of the organization rests, requires skills and experience that are not readily available among 
the rank-and-file members, the leaders of the organization gain additional power over the latter and increased freedom 
to direct the organization as they see fit. Control of such ‘administrative secrets’ makes it difficult for members to question, 
let alone effectively challenge, decisions made by the leaders. Since this knowledge accumulates with tenure, the longer 
the tenure of the leaders, the more costly and difficult it is to replace them. Formal responsibility for managing 
communications within the organization, as well as those involving the representation of the organization to the outside 
world, further enhances leaders’ power vis-ä-vis other members. As a result of these combined sources of power, Michels 
notes (1962: 70), ‘Thus the leaders, who were at first no more than the executive organs of the collective will, soon 
emancipate themselves from the mass and become independent of its control.’ 
As leaders acquire more specialized, insider knowledge of the organization, they are also likely to acquire vested 
interests in maintaining their positions within the organization. Michels underscored the importance of leaders’ material 
interests in motivating their behavior (1962: 207): ‘[T]hey hold firmly to their positions for economic reasons, coming to 
regard the functions they exercise as theirs by inalienable right... loss of their positions would be a financial disaster’. Thus, 
rather than making administrative decisions aimed at maximizing the nominal goals of the organization (those identified 
with the interests of the rank-and-file members), the leaders are inclined to govern in a way that ensures a flow of benefits 
specifically to themselves. And as their economic fortunes become tied to the survival of the organization, they become 
progressively disinclined to take actions that could lead to state or general social sanctioning, and to the ultimate 
disbanding of the organization. Sociologists have often referred to this (rather euphemistically) as a problem of ‘goal 
displacement’ or ‘goal transformation’ (Selznick 1943; Zald and Ash 1966; Jenkins 1977; Osterman 2006).1 
Recognizing common interests in maintaining their positions, leaders begin to exhibit social solidarity, protecting each 
other against any and all efforts by lower level members to dislodge or discipline them. Serious challenges to the power 
and perpetuation of leaders in office that are led by insurgent members, if not readily suppressed, are typically dealt with 
through a process of cooptation: the heads of the insurgency are brought into the inner leadership circle. The larger 
membership, deprived of its own independent leaders, is thus effectively hobbled in its resistance to the established 
leadership. 
In line with this, Michels (1962: 127) postulated the development of a sharp psychological as well as social division 
between the leaders and members. There is a clear connection in this part of Michels’s analysis to Marx’s and Weber’s 
notion of class-based social action (with organizational leaders as a klasse für sich). Organizations are portrayed as 
inevitably divided into an elite group and others, with the elites having material interests that are distinct from, and at 
least partially opposed to, those of the others. The activities of the larger membership are directed and exploited by the 
elite for the latter’s benefit. Thus, Michels’s analysis points to the use of a class-based model in explaining and analyzing 
organizational behavior (see Hinings and Tolbert 2008 for a discussion of such models within an institutional theoretic 
approach). 
A R E  O L I G A R C H I E S  I N E V I T A B L E ?  E V I D E N C E  F R O M  P O L I T I C A L  O R G A N I Z A T I O N S  
 Over the years, this model has served as a key point of departure for scholars interested in studying various forms 
of democratically oriented organizations, from trade unions to economic cooperatives to social movements. Much of this 
work has aimed at identifying the limits to the iron law—that is, the conditions that may mitigate the drift towards 
oligarchic control. 
Research on Unions 
 One of the best-known works in this tradition (perhaps the best known) is the historical analysis of the 
International Typographical Union (ITU), conducted by Lipset, Trow, and Coleman (1956) in the decade following World 
War II. Based on the claim that the ITU represented a rare, but clear exception to Michels’s postulate of the inevitability 
                                            
1 While the defining features of oligarchies, in Michels’s sense, have been subject to some dispute, several authors have argued that 
the concentration of resources in the hands of a small subset of a group, and the use of the resources specifically for the subset’s 
benefit, is a critical element (see Cassinelli 1953; Acemoglu and Robinson 2007). 
of oligarchy (as evidenced by the maintenance of two distinct opposing political factions within the union, relatively 
frequent turnover in the union s key offices, and active participation and interest by members in union politics), the 
authors sought to identify aspects of the organization that had contributed to its exceptionalism. Their answer locates the 
maintenance of the organization’s democratic functioning in unique events in the union’s historical development, which 
gave rise to a culture in which contention was legitimate; this culture was maintained by certain structural features of the 
organization and by occupationally based informal social relations. 
Structural features of the organization that supported the culture of democratic conflict included members’ right to 
use referenda to bring issues to a vote (preventing leaders from complete agenda-setting control), minimal differences in 
the salaries of union officials and members (reducing leaders’ economic interests in continued office-holding), and direct 
election of union leaders (versus selection of leaders by a smaller subset of representatives, whose votes could be more 
easily corralled). In addition, the union was characterized by very dense interpersonal ties and patterns of interactions 
among the members, due in part to the odd working hours and conditions of printers’ work that fostered social relations 
with other occupational members. Such relations prompted frequent informal discussions of union politics, thus 
contributing to members’ ongoing interest and participation. 
Although the analysis of the ITU offers intriguing insights into conditions that may help check tendencies towards 
oligarchic drift, it is impossible to disentangle the relative contributions of the different countervailing factors. It is worth 
noting, however, that work on producer cooperatives points to some of the same organizational factors as counter 
valences to oligarchic tendencies as union studies. We turn next to this literature. 
Research on Producer Cooperatives 
 Based on research on a variety of collectivist organizations (those that are employee-owned and dedicated to the 
maintenance of members’ democratic control), Rothschild-Whitt (1979) proposed an ideal type of such organizations, 
defined by core characteristics. The most elemental of these is the refusal to take the initial step that Michels identified 
as the foundation of oligarchy: delegation of authority. In enduring collectivist organizations, she argued, all key decisions 
are made collectively and require consensual agreement of all members (1979: 512). Many of the other characteristics in 
her model flow from this fundamental property, including: minimal formal rules, selection of members with similar, 
homogeneous values, and a minimum of specialization and division of labor. 
While severely limiting the delegation of authority may be feasible only in a very small set of organizations, other 
characteristics linked to membership control in her proposed model are similar to those suggested by the ITU study. For 
example, she suggested that the minimization of reward differentials among the membership, and lack of opportunities 
for individual career advancement contributed to a focus on collective interests. This parallels Lipset et al’s observations 
of the beneficial effects of limiting the differences in the compensation of the union leaders and the rank and file. An 
additional characteristic of collectivist organizations identified in her analysis, one that is relevant to Michels’s arguments 
about ‘administrative secrets’ enhancing leaders’ power, is the demystification of expertise through the rotation of jobs 
among members and through a culture that encouraged the sharing of special knowledge possessed by individual 
members. This relates to a key debate within the literature on social movement organizations (SMOs), concerning the 
impact of professional leadership on SMOs’ change efforts. 
Research on Social Movement Organizations 
 Clearly reflecting the influence of Michels’s legacy, a handful of early studies of social movements focused 
specifically on the transformation of movements into bureaucratic organizations and the accompanying transformation 
of movement goals. One exemplar of this tradition is a study of The March of Dimes, a movement begun in the 1930s, 
which mobilized thousands of volunteers over a twenty-year period to obtain support for medical research on polio (Sills 
1957). The study documented the way in which the discovery of a vaccine in the 1950s for the disease led to a crisis within 
the organization, which by that time had developed a full-time administrative staff, entered into long-term contracts for 
facilities, and gained considerable expertise in managing volunteer employees. Rather than disbanding with the 
achievement of its objective, the organization redefined its goals as raising funds to combat birth defects, a much broader 
and presumably less easily achieved goal (see also Messinger 1955; Zald and Denton 1963 for similar case studies of the 
transformation of social movements into organizations, and the accompanying transformation in mission). 
Although rarely made explicit in these analyses, the suggestion that, at base, such transformations are probably driven 
largely by the leaders’ own interests in perpetuating the organization lurks very close to the surface. But specific concern 
with the exploitation of the rank and file by the leaders as a part of such transformation, made clear in Michels’s analysis, 
is much less evident. This is also true of more contemporary work in this tradition, which has centered on a debate over 
the relative advantages and costs of professional, more centralized leadership in social movement organizations. 
This debate has its roots in the emergence of the theoretical tradition of resource mobilization in the 1970s, which 
drew attention to a largely neglected issue in the literature—the organizational properties of effective movements 
(Gamson 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978). Within this context, researchers renewed attention to the question 
raised in earlier work of the conditions that fostered a more participatory form of movement organization (versus a more 
professionalized, oligarchic form) and opened a debate on the relative costs and benefits of these different forms. 
In the first flush of the anti-corporate, anti-bureaucratic ideology that blossomed in the 1960s and early 1970s, many 
new movements in the United States sought to maintain membership control through consciously minimizing formal 
organization and hierarchical delegation of authority in particular. Some soon rediscovered the validity of Michels’s 
suggestion that high levels of participatory control can pose severe constraints on collective action (Freeman 1972) and 
came to view often ineffective participatory arrangements as part of a cultural identity that they shunned (Polleta 2002; 
Clemens and Minkoff 2004).2 Perhaps partly in response to this (and certainly in line with it), the professionalization of 
social movements— the development of a group of essentially freelance administrators with experience both in organizing 
protest activities and fund-raising for political causes—emerged as a distinctive trend by the mid-1970s (McCarthy and 
                                            
2 Despite this perception, Clemens’s (1993) research provides persuasive evidence that participatory forms are not necessarily 
ineffective, but may require that participants have sufficient personal and social resources needed for non-hierarchical coordination 
of actions. 
Zald 1977; Jenkins 1977; Gelb and Palley 1982), one that was easily identified with potential problems of oligarchy. 
In this context, researchers soon became embroiled in a debate over the relative merits and costs of more 
professionalized control of social movements, with some research suggesting that this resulted in the cooptation and de-
radicalization of movements' in terms of both tactics and goals (e.g. Piven and Cloward 1977; McAdam 1983), and others 
arguing that such conservative effects were far from inevitable (Jenkins 1977; Ruecht 1999), and that even when 
professionalization did lead to greater conservatism, it also helped to prevent the movement’s complete dissolution 
(Staggenborg 1988). Unfortunately, this debate has been cast largely in oppositional terms—that is, the guiding question 
has been whether the professionalization of movement leadership generally has a positive or negative effect on the 
maintenance and achievement of the initial movement goals. Consequently, it provides few insights into the conditions 
that may mitigate or exacerbate professionalization’s impact on these outcomes or on leadership entrenchment. One 
exception to this is provided by a study by Osterman (2006, which examined the mechanisms that allowed a social change-
oriented non-government organization (NGO) with a highly bureaucratized, oligarchically structured leadership to 
maintain high levels of involvement by the volunteer workers in the organization. His analysis suggests that this was the 
result of training provided to volunteers that encouraged and facilitated their participation, and thus gave rise to a culture 
in which discussion of (and dissension from) established policies was valued and accepted. 
As noted, though, the literature on social movement organizations has shown a surprising lack of concern with a key 
issue raised by Michels, leaders’ propensity to exploit the organization specifically for their own gain. This issue has been 
engaged, however, in a very different context, an analysis of changes in economic organizations that was first laid out in 
the early 1930s. 
E X T E N D I N G  M I C H E L S  T O  E C O N O M I C  O R G A N I Z A T I O N S  
 As suggested at the outset of this chapter, a Michelsian view of the nature of organizations is in many respects 
quite consistent with the analysis of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, a lawyer and an economist, respectively, whose 
classic work, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), addressed some of the implications of the replacement 
of owner-directed firms by managerially directed firms as dominant organizational forms in the American economy.3 We 
now turn to consider Berle and Means’s basic thesis, along with analyses that have sought to address their arguments, 
offered primarily by economists under the banner of agency theory. 
Writing in the early throes of the economy-shaking depression of the 1930s, Berle and Means focused on two major 
trends that distinguished the economic landscape of the period from earlier eras. The first was the increasing flow of 
capital into a smaller and smaller set of firms that were, necessarily, becoming clearly distinguished in both size and 
economic power from other firms. The second was the dispersal of ownership of these firms through the purchase of 
shares by larger and larger numbers of individuals; as a consequence, most stockholders held only a small fraction of a 
                                            
3 Roy (1997) provides a very provocative and compelling account of the historical processes that enabled large publicly held 
corporations to dominate the US economy by the time Berle and Means offered their analysis. 
company’s total shares, and their exercise of stockholder power (e.g. through selling off their shares) generally had no 
discernible effect on the functioning of the organization. 
As a result, they argued, top-level managers of these organizations were no longer constrained to follow the wishes of 
stockholders, the nominal owners of the firm, and were empowered to run it in ways that they saw fit—which were likely 
to entail enhancement of their own positions, either through continuing organizational growth (allowing them to derive 
both greater status and compensation from their positions) or through siphoning off resources from the firm via various 
corporate perks for managers (represented as part of normal, if perhaps not absolutely necessary, business operations) 
or both. In their words: 
In its new aspect the corporation is a means whereby the wealth of innumerable individuals has been concentrated 
into huge aggregates and whereby control over this wealth has been surrendered to a unified direction. The power 
attendant upon such concentration has brought forth princes of industry, whose position in the community is yet to be 
defined... The direction of industry by persons other than those who have ventured their wealth has raised the question 
of the motive force back of such direction and the effective distribution of the returns from business enterprise. ([1932] 
1991: 4) 
Much of their discussion of the nature of stockholders’ loss of control over the firm’s direction focused on the way in 
which managers are elected by stockholders. This typically entails ratification of a slate of candidates chosen by the board 
of directors—who are themselves originally selected by top managers—through proxy votes. As they note, the slate 
(unsurprisingly) is usually composed of existing management members. In the absence of social connections and 
organization among stockholders, it is virtually impossible for any significant voting block to emerge to change the 
selection process, resulting in a ‘self-perpetuating oligarchy’ (Mizruchi 2004: 581). The similarity of this depiction to 
Michels’s discussion of the machinations of leadership groups to preserve the illusion of democracy while perpetuating 
themselves in office is noteworthy. 
In addition to their role in selecting the board of directors, Berle and Means also alluded to the ability of managers to 
control information about and communications within organizations as an element of their autonomy from stockholder 
control. They observe that management ‘may issue financial statements of a misleading character or distribute informal 
news items which further its own market manipulations’ ( [1932] 1991:115). Although not elaborated, this observation 
offers a parallel to Michels’s arguments about control of information as a source of leadership power. 
Also like Michels, Berle and Means suggest that the interests of the management (leaders) commonly diverge from 
those of the stockholder owners (rank and file). They catalog some of the ways in which such diverging interests may be 
manifested, a catalog that is particularly interesting in light of some of the organizational debacles of the early twenty-
first century: 
Profits may be shifted from a parent corporation to a subsidiary in which the controlling group has a large interest. 
Particularly profitable business may be diverted to a second corporation largely owned by the controlling group….When 
it comes to the questions of distributing such profits as are made, self-seeking control may strive to divert profit from 
one class of stock to another, if, as frequently occurs, it holds interests in the latter issue. In market operations, such 
control may use ‘inside information’ to buy low from present stockholders and sell high to future stockholders. ([1932] 
1991:115) 
Although they made a prima facie case for the existence of diverging interests between managers and owners, and 
outlined the mechanisms that could allow this divergence to be enacted, Berle and Means offered little in the way of 
empirical support for such. Despite voluminous documentation for other main points of their argument, such as the 
concentration of resources in key organizations and the dispersion of stock ownership, the only evidence provided for a 
divergence in the interests of owners and control (managers) consisted of a list of railroads sent into receivership as a 
result of financial mismanagement during a fifteen-year period around the turn of the twentieth century (see [1932] 1991: 
113 n. 2). Later, more systematic research on this issue, based on the comparison of the economic performance of 
management-controlled and owner-controlled firms, turned up mixed evidence. While several studies found that profits 
and productivity were positively related to the concentration of stockholding (Monsen, Chiu, and Cooley 1968; Holl 1977; 
Hill and Snell 1989), others failed to turn up such a relation (Kamerschen 1968; Demsetz and Lehn 1985). 
The latter results are consistent with one line of work, known as agency theory, whose main tenets were initially 
proposed by economists in response to Berle and Means’s arguments. Classic work in this tradition acknowledges the 
potential divergence in the interests of stockholding owners (principals) and managers (agents of the principals), and 
focuses on identifying mechanisms that ensure agents do in fact run the firm in ways that are in concert with the principals’ 
interests (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983; see also Davis 2005). Such mechanisms include designing 
managerial incentives to align their behavior with the interests of principals (e.g. through the provision of stockownership 
to managers) and removing managers whose firms are underperforming, either through direct dismissal by the board of 
directors or as a result of takeovers by other firms and investors. As Mizruchi (2004: 586) notes, however, these 
mechanisms have some noticeable costs from the standpoint of stockholders (see also Davis and Thompson 1994), and 
there is a fair amount of evidence, from a variety of sources, that suggests that they may be less than effective, for some 
of the reasons suggested by Michels. 
A R E  M A N A G E R S ’  I N T E R E S T S  A L I G N E D  W I T H  S T O C K H O L D E R S ’  I N T E R E S T S ?  S Y M P T O M S  O F  O L I G A R C H I C  
P R O B L E M S  I N  M O D E R N  B U S I N E S S E S  
 The faltering performance of many US firms in the face of increasing global competition in the 1980s created a 
context in which agency theorists’ recommendations for increasing managerial stockholding as a means of dealing with 
problems of the separation of ownership and control were well received. Firms’ relatively poor economic showing was 
often attributed to managers’ lack of incentives to maximize shareholder value. In response, many firms undertook 
significant revisions in their managerial compensation practices, and in particular, increased stockholding as a component 
of executive pay. In larger companies today, salary represents a little less than 10 percent of CEOs’ total compensation on 
average; the bulk of compensation is derived from bonuses and the exercise of stock options (Simon 2007; see also Gerhart 
and Rynes 2003; Murphy 1999).4  
                                            
4 Stock options refer to the right to purchase a fixed amount of a company’s stock at a given price (the strike price, or exercise price). 
Executives may profit from stock options by purchasing and then selling stocks when the current value exceeds the strike price (see 
Effects of Stock Options and Ownership 
 Despite efforts to align managers’ and shareholders’ interests through managerial stock ownership and stock 
options, one does not need to look far to find examples of apparently significant misalignment. One part of the explanation 
for this is that top managers differ from average shareholders in one very key respect: the possession of specific, private 
information about the firm’s plans and functioning— or ‘administrative secrets’ in Michels’s terms. While the use of such 
knowledge in making decisions about selling or buying company stock is technically illegal, as insider trading, this is often 
hard to regulate, although there are some notable recent cases of top management prosecution for such activities. One 
example is provided by the case of Joseph Nacchio, former CEO of Qwest Communications, who is scheduled to go on trial 
(at the time of this writing) for forty-two counts of insider trading. In 2001 Nacchio sold $100.8 million in shares, knowing 
that the company’s financial woes were mounting and while presiding over an accounting scandal that led to a restated 
loss of $2.48 billion in revenue for 2000 and 2001 (Lattman and Searcey 2007). Likewise, in the infamous debacle of the 
Enron Corporation, CEO Kenneth Lay and other top managers began selling off their company stock months before the 
firm’s downward performance spiral became public knowledge, while its value was still high. Lay was later prosecuted for 
insider trading, in addition to conspiracy and fraud (McLean and Elkind 2004; US Securities and Exchange Commission 
2004). 
Moreover, the decision-making power of top managers enables them to take actions that other stockholders cannot, 
in ways that can adversely affect the others. This issue is reflected in the current controversy swirling around the issue of 
backdating stock options.5 This practice, apparently widespread before the passage of the Sarbane-Oxley Act in 2002 (Lie 
2005), has resulted in serious economic fallouts in a variety of firms. An example is provided by KB Homes, a homebuilding 
company whose CEO, Bruce Karatz, was ranked among the top five in Forbes’ yearly CEO Compensation Ranking for several 
years. Karatz became the target of a criminal probe by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for allegedly 
backdating his options to increase his pay by $41 million. In response to protests by KB’s shareholders to this alleged 
abuse, Karatz resigned and agreed to forfeit approximately $13 million in options (Corkery and Forelle 2007). (It is worth 
noting, however, that he also began collecting a $175 million exit package. The widespread provision of exit packages to 
executives is discussed below.) Research in Motion, Ltd. (RIM), the maker of Blackberry hand-held devices, offers another 
example. The company announced in early 2007 that stock-options backdating going back to the 1990s would lead to a 
financial restatement showing earnings reduced by $250 million. The co-CEOs of RIM both agreed to pay about $4.25 
million of the amount back to ‘to assist RIM in defraying costs’ while two board members on the compensation committee 
resigned without public comment (Vascellaro 2007). And in a third, especially spectacular case, the top managers of 
Comverse Technology reportedly created fictitious employee names to generate hundreds of thousands of backdated 
options and then stashed them in a secret slush fund entitled I. M. Fanton (after Phantom of the Opera) (Bray 2007). 
                                            
Gerhart and Rynes 2003 for a useful discussion of stock options as an element of compensation). 
5 Backdating of stock options involves granting an employee stock option with a date that is prior to the time the option was actually 
granted—typically a date on which the price of the stock was relatively very low. This right to purchase stocks, with knowledge of their 
actual future profitability, is clearly something that average stockholders lack, although it is not necessarily illegal. Backdating may 
require earnings restatements which can cause a company’s stock values to plunge. 
Evidence indicates that these are far from isolated cases. By May 2007, the Wall Street Journal reported that over 160 
companies were under accounting investigation by the SEC involving financial restatements totaling billions of dollars 
(Hughes 2007), leaving thousands of shareholders with plummeting revenues and asset values. More than a dozen 
executives have been indicted for illegal backdating, although only a handful have been actually convicted. 
Thus, whether compensation that emphasizes the allocation of stock ownership and stock options to managers 
effectively aligns their interests with those of other stockholders, as agency theorists have argued, seems open to 
question. While a number of studies have found an overall positive relation between rates of managerial stockholding and 
firm performance (e.g. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988; McConnell and Servaes 1990; Mehran 1995), this research also 
suggests puzzling non-linear effects that are inconsistent with agency theorists’ predictions. Other research has found 
changes in managerial ownership to have very little effect on firm performance (Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia 1999). 
The link between the size of managerial stock options and firm performance is even more equivocal (Kole 1997; Hall and 
Liebman 1998; Hall and Murphy 2000). Since there is reason to expect the effects of stock options to differ from actual 
stock ownership, the-relatively weak effects of options on firm performance are not altogether surprising (Sanders 2001). 
Effects of Market and Board Discipline 
 Similarly, a second mechanism posited to mitigate the effects of the separation of ownership and control, the 
‘market for corporate control’ (the removal of top managers of a poorly performing firm following its acquisition by 
another firm), has been greatly blunted by the widespread adoption of ‘poison pills’ and ‘golden parachutes’ among large 
companies. Poison pills are stock-issuing arrangements that substantially increase the costs of taking over a firm; these 
require acquiring firms to pay inflated dividends to the takeover target’s current stockholders. Poison pills were initially 
put in place by some firms in response to the wave of corporate raiding in the early 1980s; by the 1990s, the majority of 
large companies had adopted this defensive strategy (Davis 1991; Davis and Greve 1997). Golden parachutes are less 
directly aimed at preventing takeovers, but they serve to protect managers from adverse economic consequences if they 
are terminated or quit because of unanticipated events (including takeovers) by providing lucrative severance pay and 
other benefits. Interestingly, one of the justifications for such arrangements parallels Michels’s observation that top-level 
elites seek to perpetuate themselves in office because of the financial benefits they derive. It is argued that golden 
parachutes discourage top managers from blocking takeovers that are in the interests of other stockholders just to 
preserve their own jobs (West Publishing Company 1998). 
However, it appears that these arrangements often entail significant costs to stockholders—and in today’s corporate 
environment these costs may be higher than those associated with managerial resistance to takeovers. Big awards paid 
out to exiting executives, notwithstanding poor performance, have infuriated investors. Despite the fact that Pfizer’s stock 
declined nearly 37 percent during his five- year tenure, CEO Henry McKinnell was still awarded an exit package of over 
$200 million in 2006 (Thurm and Lublin 2006). That same year, Robert Nardelli received a $210 million severance package 
upon being fired from his head post at Home Depot. Nardelli received an annual compensation of over $127 million, yet 
Home Depot’s stock price failed to increase at all during his seven-year tenure (Mui 2007). 
Such revelations have inspired grass-roots movements among shareholders to increase executive accountability. From 
August 2006 to May 2007, over sixty companies voted on shareholder proposals that would give investors a nonbinding 
vote at the board level on executive compensation packages, although these ‘say-on-pay’ proposals have so far won the 
majority of shareholder votes in only two companies. It is doubtful that many companies will voluntarily adopt such 
proposals (Whitehouse 2007). However, in April 2007, the House began debating a bill that would give shareholders a 
nonbinding vote on the pay packages of senior executives as well as a right to vote on any golden parachute compensation 
plans (Labaton 2007). 
Both the grass-roots and legislative efforts to address problems of apparent divergence in the interests of management 
and other stockholders would be unnecessary if the third mechanism, oversight of management by the boards of directors, 
were more effective. Although directors are legally charged with representing shareholders’ interests by monitoring 
executive decisions and actions, academic research, as well as reporting by the popular press, suggest that efforts by 
boards to exercise real discipline over management are normally quite limited. 
Research highlights a number of factors that are especially likely to enhance the power of organizational executives 
and limit board control.6 CEO duality, the assignment of CEO and board chairman responsibilities to the same individual, 
is perhaps the most notorious of these factors. Duality enables the organizational leader to command greater authority 
over board members by reducing the monitoring effectiveness of outside board members (Harrison, Torres, and Kukalis 
1988; Wade, O’Reilly, and Chandratat 1990; Finkelstein 1992) and by making it more difficult for inside board members to 
act independently of the CEO (Westphal and Zajac 1995). As Jensen (1993: 36) noted, ‘The function of the chairman is to 
run board meetings and oversee the process of hiring, firing, evaluating and compensating the CEO. Clearly the CEO cannot 
perform this function apart from his or her personal interest. Without the direction of an independent leader, it is much 
more difficult for the board to perform its critical function. 
Studies have linked duality to the questionable practice of re-pricing options that are ‘underwater’, where the strike 
price is greater than the stock’s current value (Pollock, Fischer, and Wade 2002), to higher levels of executive 
compensation overall (Westphal and Zajac 1995), to greater incidences of fraudulent financial reporting (O’Connor et al 
2006), and to a greater likelihood of white-collar crime (Schnatterly 2003). In a similar way, CEOs are also likely to have 
greater power vis- a-vis the board when they are organizational incumbents, i.e. have risen through the ranks of the 
company to their position. Incumbency enables CEOs to form strong coalitions with other company executives as well as 
social ties with board members. In line with Michels’s notion of the unification of elites, research has shown that CEOs 
have a significantly lower probability of being dismissed under these conditions (Shen and Cannella 2002). 
Some evidence suggests that boards whose members are demographically similar to the CEO are more likely to take 
actions that enhance the CEO’s position. For example, a study by Westphal and Zajac (1997) indicated that the more board 
                                            
6 To say that there is a vast literature on boards of directors and the distribution of power within corporations is to understate the 
case significantly. We consider only a relatively small part of this literature, just to provide a sense of why board control may be 
problematic. 
members share key demographic characteristics with the CEO, the less likely they are to put contingent compensation 
practices in place for the CEO. Along similar lines, research by Hallock (1997) showed that demographic similarity between 
board members and the CEO was associated with significantly higher levels of CEO pay. These advantages may be a key 
reason that more powerful CEOs are more likely to replace board members with ones who are similar to themselves than 
less powerful CEOs (Westphal and Zajac 1995; Zajac and Westphal 1996; see also Duguid 2006). 
Finally, a number of studies have found a positive impact of executive tenure on CEO power (Wade, O’Reilly, and 
Chandratat 1990; Ocasio 1994). Again, in line with Michels’s arguments, it appears that as length in office increases, CEOs 
acquire expert power through an increased familiarity with the firm’s resources (Zald 1969) and personal power by 
appointing boards with supporters (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1989). Research suggests that longer CEO tenure empowers 
top managers to secure larger compensation packages, participate less in contingent compensation practices (Westphal 
and Zajac 1994; Westphal and Zajac 1995), and avoid being dismissed (Ocasio 1994) and replaced by inside succession 
(Shen and Cannella 2002). 
Thus, there is clearly reason to question the extent to which existing interestaligning mechanisms succeed in minimizing 
the divergence of managers’ and stockholders’ interests in contemporary business organizations, and preclude the 
occurrence of the kinds of problems of oligarchic control and leadership exploitation suggested by Michels’s model of 
organizations. In the following section, we consider the implications of this model for further research on firms and for 
policy. 
M I C H E L S ’ S  L E G A C Y :  I M P L I C A T I O N S  F O R  S T U D Y I N G  A N D  M A N A G I N G  C O N T E M P O R A R Y  B U S I N E S S  
O R G A N I Z A T I O N S  
 The preceding summary of the various problems that often have been identified with contemporary corporate 
management is intended to provide some graphic illustrations of the kinds of phenomena to which Michels’s concepts 
and arguments might be applied. To make use of his analysis more systematically, however, there are a number of 
conceptual issues that will require further development. One primary issue for research involves the construction of both 
theoretical and operational definitions of oligarchy. A second issue entails thinking through the implications for policy and 
ongoing efforts at corporate reform. At this juncture, we can only identify some of the issues that seem most critical to us 
on each of these fronts and offer some initial thoughts on handling them. 
Research Implications 
 At first blush, both theoretical and operational definitions of the phenomenon to which Michels draws attention 
would seem to involve a categorical state: either an organization is characterized by oligarchy or it is not. However, we 
suspect that, in the long run, it will be more useful to work on definitions and related measures that are continuous—that 
is, to treat oligarchy as a matter of degree. Although Michels does not define the concept specifically, his analysis suggests 
a number of different dimensions that are relevant. 
One is, obviously, concentration of decision-making power in the hands of a relatively small subset of organizational 
members, or a high level of centralization, in the parlance of organizational theory. Thus, the degree of centralization 
would be one component of a definition of the degree of oligarchy. Unfortunately, while there is a long and venerable 
tradition of research on this aspect of structure (see Hall and Tolbert 2004; Scott and Davis 2007), this has not led to 
significant agreement on how best to measure it, and this issue merits more attention from organizational researchers. 
A second dimension involves the entrenchment of a leadership group, or the stability of this group (i.e. longer average 
tenure would serve as a component indicator of a higher degree of oligarchy). Although much work on managerial 
entrenchment has focused simply on CEO tenure (e.g. Wade, O’Reilly, and Chandratat 1990; Westphal and Zajac 1995), 
we argue that using information on the top management team is preferable, since it is possible that turnover among CEOs 
as a result of scapegoating (Boeker 1992) may obscure the amount of stability that actually exists in the leadership group. 
In empirical studies, the degree of stability is apt to be partly a function of the parameters used to define this group. 
In general, more objective criteria seem preferable to us, as well as ones that produce groups of a fairly consistent size. 
One pragmatic (albeit admittedly arbitrary) approach would be to use the top five managers, since standard archival 
resources often contain information on these (e.g. Hoover’s Complete Guide to U.S. Public Companies), including length 
of tenure. An alternative—or additional— component of the operationalization of entrenchment might be the frequency 
of inside succession to the CEO position, based on the assumption that inside succession signals a more entrenched 
leadership group. 
Yet a third dimension suggested by Michels is the degree to which leaders are insulated from control by the rank and 
file. In the context of contemporary economic organizations, this is most likely to involve relations between top managers 
and the board of directors, since by law, managers are charged with acting in the fiduciary interests of stockholders, and 
the board is charged with ensuring such.7 It is common to use the proportion of outsiders on the board (those not 
employed by an organization) as a reverse indicator of leadership insulation (Westphal and Zajac 1997: 512), based on the 
assumption that such directors will be more likely to question a CEO’s decisions. Indeed, one of the key recommendations 
for corporate reform has been to require more outside directors (Fama and Jensen 1983), though the evidence on whether 
such directors actually ensure CEOs’ and managers’ commitment to stockholder interests is equivocal (see e.g. Wade, 
O’Reilly, and Chandratat 1990; Duguid 2006). Alternative indicators might include CEO duality, or the appointment of the 
current CEO as board chair, and/or the proportion of board members appointed by the current CEO. 
Although individual dimensions (and even single measures) could serve as indicators of oligarchy in empirical studies, 
the development of a multidimensional measure is conceptually more defensible for examining the validity of Michels’s 
arguments. Such examinations could focus on the relationship between the measure of oligarchy and an array of outcomes 
suggested in the preceding review of corporate problems, including firms’ adoption of arrangements that often benefit 
managers but provide questionable value to shareholders (such as poison pills and golden parachutes), the frequency of 
                                            
7 Note that Berle and Means considered the board to be part of the management structure: ‘direction of the activities of the 
corporation is exercised through the board of directors’ (quoted in Mizruchi 2004: 591). Although we appreciate the logic of this 
argument, we think it is more useful to conceptualize the board as representatives of stockholders—that is its legal function. 
backdating of stock options by managerial members, increasing executive compensation in the face of declining firm 
performance, and so forth. In this context, an interesting potential agenda for future research that, as far as we know, has 
not been examined at all is linking more objective indicators of oligarchy in a firm to managers’ attitudes towards a 
stewardship role in the firm, and indicators of firms’ orientation towards social corporate responsibility. 
Policy Implications 
 A Michelsian view of organizations not only provides a framework for addressing a variety of research problems, 
extant research that has been generated by Michels’s arguments also contains potentially useful insights for policy 
involving corporate reform. Looking across the studies from unions, economic cooperatives, and social movement 
organizations described above, we can identify a number of forces or arrangements that may minimize oligarchic abuses 
in business organizations. 
One important factor, suggested by the ITU study, is the division of organizational elites—and here, we are thinking 
primarily of the board of directors— into self-consciously differing factions. Some small groups research suggests that 
formally assigning different expert roles to individuals can serve as an antidote to groupthink (Stasser and Titus 1985); by 
the same token, selecting or assigning directors to represent different factions of stockholders—employee stockholders, 
institutional investors, etc.—might provide impetus for fuller discussion of issues and enhance decision making within the 
organization.8 
A second factor, pointed up in work on unions, collectives, and social movement organizations, is sharing knowledge 
of administrative expertise, thus diluting power based on the possession of ‘administrative secrets’. Again, focusing on 
the board as the embodiment of stockholders’ and non-managers’ interests, one way to achieve this might be ensuring 
regular rotation of board chairmanships (and would entail eliminating CEO duality), and also setting term limits for board 
members. We recognize the trade-off here: shorter tenures for chairs and board members could also work against the 
acquisition of relevant knowledge of firm operations, thus weakening the effective power of the board by making it more 
difficult for members to challenge the rationales offered by managers for given action (see Lipset 1950). Hence, careful 
thought would have to be given to the details of such arrangements (e.g. the best length of term limits for effective 
participation by board members). 
A third factor, also underscored in studies of unions and collectives, involves creating better mechanisms for input by 
stockholders (the corporate analog of the rank and file). Lipset, Trow, and Coleman (1956) provide persuasive 
documentation of the role of member-generated referenda as a means of countering union leaders’ ability to control 
which issues were placed on the public decision-making agenda. The development of such mechanisms in economic 
corporations have, for many years, been thwarted by SEC rules, including ones that limited any communications among 
stockholders aimed at influencing stockholder votes (Black 1990). If more than ten stockholders were to be contacted, 
                                            
8 The same idea is embodied in the use of employee and labor director positions on the boards of German corporations, and in the 
representation of a wide range of stakeholders (including company employees, ex-government officials, trading partners, and bank 
officials) on the boards of Japanese corporations (Ahmadjian 2001). 
this was defined as an interest group, and if the group owned more than 5 percent of company stock, then the SEC required 
examination and approval of the communications in advance. Presumably such rules reflected a populist ideology, that is, 
the protection of the interests of smaller and unorganized investors, but in practice, these often enhanced managerial 
autonomy, as suggested by the fact that members of the Business Roundtable fought changes in these rules, changes that 
were finally implemented in 1992 and helped to set off a wave of institutional investor activism (Davis and Thompson 
1994). While previous restrictions have been lifted, more systematic encouragement of input from investors could serve 
to ensure fuller consideration of different viewpoints in both board and day-to-day management decisions. Such 
arrangements have already been implemented in the United Kingdom, Australia, The Netherlands, and Sweden, where 
stockholders have been given advisory votes on annual decisions concerning executive compensation (Ossinger 2006; 
White and Patrick 2007). 
Finally, as noted, recent work on social movement organizations suggests that organizational conservatism and 
managerial self-enhancement are not inevitable outcomes of conditions that are associated with oligarchic control; this is 
also affected by the culture of organizational leaders. In particular, Osterman’s (2006) study suggests that a culture in 
which challenges to managerial decisions are accepted and valued can be cultivated by relevant training of both managers 
and subordinates (see also Postmes, Spears, and Cihangir 2001). Unfortunately, it is not clear that the current business 
training that most managers (and board members) have received encourages this. In fact, several studies suggest that 
greater exposure to economic theory, which predominates in business education, encourages individuals to give greater 
attention and weight to self-interests in making decisions, even decisions involving collective goods (Frank, Gilovich, and 
Regan 1993,1996; Marwell and Ames 1981). How to change this influence in management education is clearly a thorny 
issue (a bit like trying to move a graveyard, to borrow Woodrow Wilson’s famous phrase), but one that, certainly from a 
Michelsian vantage point on organizations, warrants much more consideration by management scholars and educators.
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